[ SECURITY ]

Audits, contest and bounty

Immutable core contracts, a minimal governance surface and layered independent review. Summaries below; full PDF reports ship with the public repository at mainnet.

Audit · Core lending markets

Scope: vault accounting, interest accrual, collateral management, health factor math. Two independent firms, Q1 2026, four engineer-weeks each.

SeverityFoundStatus
Critical0n/a
High0n/a
Medium2Resolved and re-reviewed
Low / informational6Resolved

Both medium findings concerned rounding direction in share-price math under extreme utilization; fixes were verified with fuzz suites of 10M+ runs.

Audit · Oracle and NAV module

Scope: dual-feed aggregation, NAV attestation verification, deviation halts, market-hours bands. Q1 2026.

SeverityFoundStatus
Critical0n/a
High0n/a
Medium1Resolved and re-reviewed
Low / informational4Resolved

The medium finding covered attestation replay within a stale window; signatures now bind block height and market id.

Public contest · Liquidation engine

A four-week open competition covering the Dutch-auction engine and keeper incentives. 312 researchers participated.

  • 3 medium findings confirmed, all fixed before code freeze.
  • No path to lender loss was demonstrated.
  • Invariants (auction monotonicity, health restoration, penalty bounds) were formally verified after fixes.

Bug bounty

A standing program, administered via Immunefi, live from mainnet day one. Payouts in stablecoins, scaled by severity and funds at risk:

SeverityExampleMax reward
CriticalDirect theft or freezing of user funds$2,000,000
HighTheft of unclaimed yield, oracle manipulation$250,000
MediumGriefing with material cost, broken invariants$50,000
LowBest-practice deviations with impact$5,000

Responsible disclosure: security@heartwood.finance. Please do not test against production markets.

Operational security

  • Immutable core. Market logic is non-upgradeable; new features ship as new markets.
  • 48-hour timelock. Every parameter change queues publicly for 48 hours before execution.
  • Pause-only guardian. Emergency powers can pause new activity; they can never move user funds.
  • Zero admin keys to funds. No role in the system can transfer user collateral or deposits.
  • Formal verification. Interest accrual and health-factor invariants are machine-checked against the specification.
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